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About SIRJ
Swarthmore International Relations Journal (SIRJ) is an undergraduate journal publishing works
on global affairs. Established in 2016, SIRJ is student written, edited, and produced. The primary
goals of SIRJ are twofold: to help foster a new generation of scholars, and to bring fresh, liberal
arts perspectives to international relations. Through a peer-reviewed editing process, SIRJ seeks
to become a major vehicle for undergraduate research on international relations, and encourage
critical and intellectual dialogues among scholars.

Swarthmore International Relations Journal

Winter 2019

Dear Reader
Dear Reader,
Thank you for your interest in the Swarthmore Internationals Relations Journal.
After three years of publishing undergraduate research on international relations, we have
decided to pause production of this journal to rethink how Swarthmore can best contribute to a
wide-reaching conversation about international relations and global affairs.
Particularly in light of Swarthmore’s new Global Studies Program—spearheaded by Professors
Ayse Kaya and Carina Yervasi—we wanted to take this opportunity to re-conceptualize this
journal and its contributions to the study of pressing global issues on our campus.
While production of this journal will cease until further notice, we wanted to share with you two
exemplary essays on the theme of Global Order in this special issue. We believe that these are
timely and important contributions to current academic debates.
We would like to thank all of the students, alumni, staff, and faculty who have been involved in
this publication since 2016.
Thank you for reading, and we look forward to sharing future projects from the Global Studies
Program and the Global Affairs initiative at the Lang Center for Civic and Social Responsibility.
Sincerely,
The SIRJ Advisory Board
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Editor’s Note
Thank you for reading the third issue of the Swarthmore International Relations Journal (SIRJ).
In light of contemporary currents in international relations, this special edition is dedicated to
one theme: emerging challenges of global order. As the balance of global power shifts and
emerging challengers become increasingly influential, international norms are contested in the
landscape of international political change. In this issue, the essays focus on the dynamics of
such contest and have gone through a rigorous review process. As a tradition of this journal, SIRJ
has continued the blind-review practice to ensure quality of our articles. SIRJ has also continued
to strengthen the collaboration among students, alumni, and faculty. I hope that this special
edition will bring value to Swarthmore and a broader scholarly community.
In this special edition, you will find two articles on the theme of emerging challenges to global
order. The first essay investigates how the Paris Climate Agreement shifts authority from state
actors to non-state actors. This essay dives into the dynamics of power shifts and the relevant
impact on emerging global order. The second essay analyzes the challenges faced by the
European Union (E.U.). Through the lens of Sebastian Rosato’s balance of power theory, the
second essay discusses how the E.U.’s development implicates interstate cooperation. Both
essays were carefully selected from a large volume of submissions and have made significant
intellectual contributions to this forward-looking issue on emerging challenges to global order.
As the former student editors of SIRJ would attest, in addition to publishing great articles, there
has always been a supportive and collaborative culture at this journal, including the desire to
share credit for the success of this special edition. I am grateful for all who have involved with
this journal for the past three years. I also respectfully add my thank you to all the people that our
former Editor-in-Chief Elizabeth Tolley has mentioned. Furthermore, on behalf of myself and
the rest of Editorial Board, I offer my heartfelt appreciation to Dr. Katie Price, Professor
Dominic Tierney, Professor Ben Berger, Professor Emily Paddon Rhoads, Librarian Maria
Aghazarian, and Editorial Fellows Lindsay Dolan and George Yin for their contributions towards
making SIRJ what it is today.
Sincerely,
Editorial Board
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The Paris Climate Agreement - Harbinger of a New Global Order
Shana Herman
Swarthmore College

I. Introduction
In recent decades, climate change has become an increasingly tangible threat to human
existence on Earth. In fact, a combination of climate-related forces (e.g. natural disasters,
extreme weather events, and droughts) and carbon-related forces (e.g. air pollution and asthma)
already claim about five million lives annually.1 This value is only projected to increase and will
account for about six million global deaths per year by 2030.2 While climate change has and will
continue to disproportionately affect low-income communities, people of color, and indigenous
populations, as well as poorer and smaller countries and island nations that are the least
responsible for the carbon dioxide emissions that have contributed to it, climate change is
indisputably a collective global crisis with shared consequences that will ultimately affect every
country on Earth, regardless of affluence or military prowess.3
Recently, as the consequences of anthropogenic climate change have grown increasingly
visible, countries have begun to come together to address this crisis on an international level. In
November of 2015, leaders from 197 countries met with the goal of ushering in a new era of
international climate change negotiations characterized by meaningful national commitments to
mitigate climate change and secure a livable future for all. The product of this conference
became known as the Paris Agreement. Since its conception, the Agreement has been praised—
by politicians, international relations scholars, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and
more—as “historic,” “a landmark agreement,” “a turning point” for our planet and for the
international climate regime, and “the world’s greatest diplomatic success.”4 The Agreement has
also been criticized for being “far too weak” and for providing the world with a sense of “false
hope.”5
1

Climate Vulnerability Monitor: A Guide to the Cold Calculus of a Hot Planet, report, 2nd ed., 15, accessed
October 10, 2017, http://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/CVM2-Low.pdf.
2
Ibid, 17.
3
Julian Agyeman, Harriet Bulkeley, and Aditya Nochur, “Climate Justice,” in Ignition: What What You Can Do to
Fight Global Warming and Spark a Movement, ed. John Isham and S. Waage (Washington D.C.: Island Press,
2007), 136.
4
Daniel Bodansky, “The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?” The American Journal of International
Law 110, no. 2 (2016): 289, accessed October 10, 2017. doi:10.5305/amerjintelaw.110.2.0288.
5
Tom Bawden, “Paris Climate Deal ‘Far Too Weak to Prevent Devastating Global Warming,’” The Independent,
January 8, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/cop21-paris-deal-far-too-weak-toprevent-devastating-climate-change-academics-warn-a6803096.html.
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This paper investigates how the politics of the Paris Climate Agreement – its design,
ratification, and enforcement – both reaffirm and challenge the existing global order. Throughout
this paper, “Party,” “state,” and “country” will be used interchangeably. The design and
ratification of the Agreement have facilitated international cooperation by inhibiting free-riding
through social pressure and transparency, and by enabling Parties to determine their own
mitigation commitments; this in turn supports the existing global order in which states share and
exercise power through international institutions. Simultaneously, the enforcement of the Paris
Agreement has already begun to meaningfully challenge the existing global order by
redistributing power among its actors, evident in the increasing influence of substate and
nonstate actors in international politics. Overall, while some aspects of the Agreement’s
development and function reaffirm the existing global order, the politics of the Paris Agreement
provide clear evidence of a new emerging global order. The Paris Agreement therefore has very
significant implications for the future of international relations.
II. Background
Before delving into how the politics of the Paris Agreement are indicative of a new
emerging global order, it is essential to first clarify what is meant by global order. According to
scholar Richard Falk, the global order refers to “the distribution of power and authority among
the political actors on the global stage.”6 Power can be defined as “the means by which a state or
other actor wields or can assert actual or potential influence or coercion relative to other states
and non state actors because of the potential, geographic, economic and financial, technological,
military, social, cultural, or other capabilities it possesses.”7 Soft power is of particular concern
in this paper. In essence, soft power refers to “non-material capabilities such as reputation,
culture, and value appeal that can aid the attainment of a state’s objectives.”8 As renowned
international relations scholar Joseph Nye argues, soft power is not exercised through military or
economic force, but rather, it is “the ability to shape the preferences of others” and “[get] others
to want outcomes that you want.”9 The exertion of soft power by states is frequently facilitated
through international negotiations and institutions. Collaboration through democratic
international institutions, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), is a key norm that characterizes the existing global order that emerged after the end
of World War II in 1945 and that is largely defined by liberal international relations theory.10
6

Richard Falk, “World Orders, Old and New,” Current History 98 (January 1, 1999): 29, accessed January 10,
2018, https://search-proquest-com.proxy.swarthmore.edu/docview/1309780844?pq-origsite=gscholar.
7
Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics, 5th ed. (New York, NY: Pearson,
2013), 202.
8
Ibid, 207.
9
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 5.
10
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Will the Liberal Order Survive?” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 1 (Jan. & Feb. 2017):, accessed
January 7, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/will-liberal-order-survive.

Page 4

Swarthmore International Relations Journal

Winter 2019

Another key element of the existing global order is that, for decades, states (i.e. national
governments) have been the primary actors in the international arena.
As previously mentioned, the Paris Agreement was the culminating product of the
twenty-first Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 21), held in Paris in November of
2015. Of the 197 Parties that attended the Convention, 179 have ratified the Agreement to date.11
While it is projected that more Parties will soon ratify the Agreement, many of those that appear
to be hesitant are oil-rich countries that are heavily dependent on the petroleum industry.12 The
Paris Agreement has three key goals: first, to keep average global temperatures well below 2
degrees Celsius of warming above pre-industrial levels, and strive to limit this increase to 1.5
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels; next, to increase adaptation and resilience
mechanisms and development of technologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions without
compromising food production; and finally, to allocate funds appropriately and efficiently in
order to achieve the previously stated goals.13
The Paris Agreement differs from previous international climate negotiations, which have
generally employed top-down command-and-control strategies involving legally binding
obligations, in that it does not prescribe or mandate minimum emission reduction targets; rather,
the Paris Agreement provides Parties with the flexibility to establish their own intended
nationally determined commitments (INDCs or NDCs) to reduce emissions in a bottom-up
approach.14 These NDCs are intended to go into effect in 2020, with the goal of countries
peaking their emissions as soon as possible.15
While the Paris Agreement does not require that Parties meet specific emission reduction
targets or reduce their emissions through any particular mechanisms, it does require each Party to
“prepare, communicate, and maintain successive [NDCs]”, and “pursue domestic mitigation
measures” to achieve the goals of these contributions.16 In essence, Parties are solely required to
publish reports detailing their goals and progress. The agreement also contains a “ratchet
mechanism.” Parties are required to communicate an NDC every five years, with the assumption
that states will steadily increase the ambition of these commitments over time, ultimately
achieving net zero emissions by the second half of the century.17 Through these NDCs, the
Agreement introduces the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
11

“The Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification,” UNFCCC, accessed July 26, 2018, https://unfccc.int/process/theparis-agreement/status-of-ratification.
12
“Paris Agreement Ratification Tracker,” Climate Analytics, accessed January 14, 2018,
http://climateanalytics.org/briefings/ratification-tracker.html.
13
“Paris Agreement,” UNFCCC, 2, accessed July 26, 2018,
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf.
14
Jennifer Jacquet and Dale Jamieson, “Soft but significant power in the Paris Agreement,” Nature Climate Change
6, no. 7 (July 2016): 644, accessed October 10, 2017, doi:10.1038/nclimate3006.
15
“Paris Agreement,” 3.
16
Ibid.
17
Sophie Yeo, “Timeline: The Paris Agreement’s ‘Ratchet Mechanism,’” Carbon Brief, January 19, 2016,
https://www.carbonbrief.org/timeline-the-paris-agreements-ratchet-mechanism.
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capabilities of different countries to address climate change, depending on distinct national
circumstances; this approach is designed to increase equity in mitigation burden.18
III. The Politics of Design & Ratification – Facilitating International Cooperation
Despite the potential for increased equity to promote cooperation between countries,
many realist international relations scholars argue that there exist significant barriers to
cooperation. One of the core tenets of realism is that states are self-interested actors that are
constantly engaged with other states in a perpetual struggle for power.19 Many realists attribute
this struggle to states’ inherent concern for their own survival.20 This mentality of selfpreservation may present an issue in international negotiations. According to realist thinker
Kenneth Waltz,
Great tasks can be accomplished only by agents of great capability. That is why states,
and especially the major ones, are called on to do what is necessary for the world’s
survival. But states have to do whatever they think is necessary for their own
preservation, since no one can be relied on to do it for them.21
Since the Paris Agreement enables Parties to establish their own emission reduction
commitments without imposing a minimum target, Waltz’s claim implies that, because states are
unlikely to place international interests above national interests, Parties may set low
commitments so as to avoid jeopardizing national interests, such as economic security. In this
way, Parties will benefit from the efforts taken by other states to mitigate climate change without
making their own contributions, essentially free-riding.22 Realists argue that the Paris Agreement
further enables free-riding due to its lack of enforcement and repercussion mechanisms for
Parties that do not fulfill their NDCs.23 Ultimately, realists believe that the free-riding produced
by this Agreement will make international cooperation difficult to sustain.
Renowned realist John Mearsheimer asserts that “states can cooperate, although
cooperation is sometimes difficult to achieve and always difficult to sustain. Two factors inhibit

18

“Paris Agreement,” 2.
Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 110 (1998): 31,
doi:10.2307/1149275.
20
Ibid.
21
Kenneth Neal Waltz, “The Anarchic Structure of World Politics,” in Theory of International Politics (McGraw
Hill, 1979), 44, accessed October 10, 2017, http://www.drmalikcikk.atw.hu/wp_readings/waltz.pdf.
22
Susanne Dröge, “The Paris Agreement 2015: Turning Point for the International Climate Regime,” Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs, February 2016, 8, accessed
October 10, 2017, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2016RP04_dge.pdf.
23
Guri Bang, Jon Hovi, and Tora Skodvin, “The Paris Agreement: Short-Term and Long-Term Effectiveness,”
Politics and Governance 4, no. 3 (2016): 211, accessed October 10, 2017, doi:10.17645/pag,y4i3.640.
19
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cooperation: considerations about relative gains and concern about cheating.”24 In the case of the
Paris Agreement, Parties worry that by substantially committing to reduce their emissions, they
will benefit, but ultimately less than Parties that make smaller commitments, due to the national
burdens of reducing emissions. Parties also fear that others will cheat by free-riding on their
efforts, rather than establishing their own significant commitments.
Despite the validity of these concerns, the Paris Agreement combats these barriers to
cooperation in several ways. Firstly, because other Parties will be reporting commitments and the
progress that they have made in attaining these goals, the Paris Agreement fosters a strong
culture of international social pressure.25 It reflects poorly on a Party if they do not set forth and
attempt to uphold meaningful commitments. Failing to take meaningful action to address the
climate crisis and free-riding on the efforts of other countries, especially if this behavior comes
from wealthier countries that are responsible for the majority of emissions, does not only harm a
Party’s public image, but also its relations with other Parties.26 The influence of social pressure,
however, lies not in the Party’s public image itself, but rather how that image matches up to
those of other Parties. As scholars Ann Towns and Bahar Rumelili argue, “[i]t is through
comparative assessments — the normative ordering of states as superior and inferior and
placement in a social hierarchy — that social pressure is exerted and states are prodded into
action;” social pressure is powerful and effective because states do not want to rank low in this
social hierarchy.27 Parties, as a result, are likely to set meaningful NDCs and strive to achieve
these goals in order to avoid such repercussions.28
The Paris Agreement’s requirement for transparency through mandatory NDC reporting
further pressures Parties to put forward and meet significant commitments. By making
information regarding Parties’ commitments and progress (or lack thereof) publically available,
the Paris Agreement encourages other Parties and the broader public to “name and shame”
Parties that are not taking meaningful action to reduce their emissions.29 If a Party sets forth a
comparatively weak commitment (defying international normative standards) or if its actual
behavior does not align with its stated commitments (hypocrisy), exposing and bringing public
attention to these gaps “renders the targeted state as a transgressor or underperformer, which
24

John J. Mearsheimer, “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power,” in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 2014), 51-52, accessed October 10, 2017,
http://www.ucs.mun.ca/~russellw/Teaching_files/Mearsheimer%20-%20Realism.pdf.
25
Bodansky, “The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?” 291.
26
Samantha Page, “No, The Paris Climate Agreement Isn’t Binding. Here’s Why That Doesn’t Matter,” accessed
October 10, 2017, https://thinkprogress.org/no-the-paris-climate-agreement-isnt-binding-here-s-why-that-doesn-tmatter-62827c72bb04/.
27
Ann E. Towns and Bahar Rumelili, “Taking the Pressure: Unpacking the Relation between Norms, Social
Hierarchies, and Social Pressures on States,” European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 4 (2017): 756,
accessed April 25, 2018, doi:10.1177/1354066116682070.
28
Page, “No, The Paris Climate Agreement Isn’t Binding. Here’s Why That Doesn’t Matter.”
29
Catherine Martini, “Transparency: The Backbone of the Paris Agreement,” accessed October 10, 2017,
http://envirocenter.yale.edu/transparency-the-backbone-of-the-Paris-Agreement.
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produces embarrassment, shame, or status anxiety.”30 Transparency therefore incentivizes Parties
to attain their NDCs in an attempt to avoid international public judgement.31 The exposure of this
gap alone, however, is not sufficient to influence state behavior; here, the concept of social
hierarchies and the role that they play in producing social pressure are central. As Towns and
Rumelili assert, “[s]tates do not simply respond to the exposure of a gap between a norm or
commitment and actual deeds — they react to being compared as inferior or superior to other
states by means of norms. […] [T]he placement of states in a social hierarchy is a key dynamic
in social pressure and in the generation of shame.”32 Social pressure to avoid being perceived as
inferior to other states therefore epitomizes states’ ability to exercise soft power through
international institutions.
In Activists Beyond Borders, authors Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink claim that
“moral leverage may be especially relevant where states are actively trying to raise their status in
the international system” (i.e. move up in the international social hierarchy).33 As previously
discussed, the realist view of international relations maintains that all states are in a perpetual
struggle for power, obtained through positionality in the international system in relation to other
states. According to this view, every state is therefore perpetually striving to achieve this goal. If
moral leverage, such as that gained by meaningfully committing to reduce emissions and
mitigate climate change (especially when other states commit less), does indeed play an
important role in raising a state’s status in the international system, it is natural to infer that states
will set forth and endeavor to attain meaningful commitments. Ultimately, the international
social pressure produced by the Paris Agreement’s requirements for continual reporting and
transparency inhibits free-riding with respect to mitigation efforts and facilitates international
cooperation; this in turn reaffirms the existing global order in which states share and exercise
power through international institutions because through this social pressure, states are
collectively able to exert influence over certain states that may otherwise free-ride.
Beyond combatting issues associated with relative gains and free-riding, the politics of
the Paris Agreement also promote cooperation by allowing Parties to determine their own
mitigation commitments. Previously, international climate negotiations were centered around
legally binding emission reduction targets based on a country’s historic emission levels and
financial ability. This approach has historically deterred Parties, specifically more industrialized
nations, from ratifying international climate negotiations, such as the Kyoto Protocol.34 By
altering its strategy and introducing the concept of NDCs, the Paris Agreement eliminates one of
30

Towns and Rumelili, “Taking the Pressure: Unpacking the Relation between Norms, Social Hierarchies, and
Social Pressures on States,” 757.
31
Bodansky, “The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?” 291.
32
Towns and Rumelili, “Taking the Pressure: Unpacking the Relation between Norms, Social Hierarchies, and
Social Pressures on States,” 757.
33
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders (Cornell University Press, 1998), 29.
34
Robert Falkner, “The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics,” International Affairs
92, no. 5 (September 2016): 1108, accessed October 10, 2017, doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12708.
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the greatest barriers to international cooperation surrounding climate change mitigation.35
Eliminating this barrier to cooperation, however, may introduce a moral hazard problem since
the Parties that will sign onto the Paris Agreement due to its non-binding and voluntary
approach, but would not sign onto more stringent agreements, are likely the least committed
states to developing and implementing comprehensive climate policy. Despite this concern, there
is still value in attracting these countries to the Agreement since any contribution to mitigating
climate change is better than none. Additionally, as Nye asserts, “attraction leads to
acquiescence” through the exercising of soft power (e.g. social pressure).36
As previously discussed, social pressure may also influence these states to take
meaningful action. Overall, through encouraging cooperation between countries, the design and
ratification of the Paris Agreement reaffirm the liberal global order defined by international
cooperation and the sharing and exercising of state power through democratic institutions,
negotiations, and treaties.
IV. The Politics of Enforcement – Increasing Influence of Substate & Nonstate Actors
While some aspects of the Agreement’s design and ratification reaffirm the existing
global order, the politics surrounding the enforcement of the Paris Agreement are indicative of a
new emerging global order. Firstly, the politics of the Paris Agreement redistribute power among
the political actors on the global stage by increasing the power and influence of substate and
nonstate actors. In recent years across many sectors of society, substate and nonstate actors—
including civil society, NGOs, social movements, businesses, trade unions, regional and local
governments, cities, municipalities, indigenous peoples, and youth—have become increasingly
influential in the international political arena.37 In the past several decades, substate and nonstate
actors have increasingly taken action to address climate change independently, through
transnational networks, and in collaboration with states and international organizations; such
efforts multiplied greatly and garnered substantial attention in the lead-up to and during the
negotiations in Paris.38 The politics of the Paris Agreement exemplify the mounting influence of
substate and nonstate actors in the international climate regime. In fact, a key element of COP 21
was the regime’s embrace of climate action by such actors.39
At previous COPs, many substate and nonstate actors have participated as observer
organizations. Under this role, they may attend certain intergovernmental negotiations and

35

Falkner, “The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics,” 1108.
Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 6.
37
Karin Bäckstrand et al., “Non-state actors in global climate governance: from Copenhagen to Paris and
beyond,” Environmental Politics 26, no. 4 (May 26, 2017): 562, accessed January 7, 2018,
doi:10.1080/09644016.2017.1327485.
38
Thomas Hale, “‘All Hands on Deck’: The Paris Agreement and Nonstate Climate Action,” Global Environmental
Politics 16, no. 3 (August 2016): 13, accessed January 7, 2018, doi:10.1162/glep_a_00362.
39
Ibid, 12.
36
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occasionally submit information and comments.40 The Paris Agreement reaffirms this role,
stating that “[a]ny body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or nongovernmental, which is qualified in matters covered by this Agreement and which has informed
the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties serving
as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least
one third of the Parties present object.”41 Many substate and nonstate actors have also organized
side events, exhibitions, and protests during the negotiations.42 Such actors have historically
played the role of activist, lobbyist, and information provider.43 While substate and nonstate
actors continue to be present at COPs as observer organizations, the design of the Paris
Agreement provides such actors with a greater role in monitoring national action and
experimenting with local, regional, and transnational approaches to mitigating and adapting to
climate change.44
The ways in which the Paris Agreement establishes a larger role for substate and nonstate
actors, thereby increasing their influence, are evident in the text of the Agreement.45 In
“[r]ecognizing the importance of the engagements of all levels of government and various actors,
in accordance with respective national legislations of Parties, in addressing climate change,” the
Agreement explicitly seeks to “[e]nhance public and private sector participation in the
implementation of nationally determined contributions” and “[t]o incentivize and facilitate
participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by public and private entities
authorized by a Party.”46 Furthermore, the Agreement requires Parties to “cooperate in taking
measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness,
public participation and public access to information, recognizing the importance of these steps
with respect to enhancing actions under this Agreement.”47 The Paris Agreement’s goal in
expanding and strengthening the role of substate and nonstate actors is to assist Parties in
implementing NDCs, and to increase public engagement and participation in order to enhance
mitigation efforts. To reiterate, power essentially refers to the ability of actors to assert influence
relative to other actors. Through explicitly providing substate and nonstate actors with a more
significant role in the international climate regime, the Paris Agreement increases the power of

40

Harro van Asselt, “The Role of Non-State Actors in Reviewing Ambition, Implementation, and Compliance
Under the Paris Agreement,” Climate Law 6, no. 1 (2016): 4, accessed January 7, 2018, doi:10.1163/1878656100601006.
41
“Paris Agreement,” 13.
42
Van Asselt, “The Role of Non-State Actors in Reviewing Ambition, Implementation, and Compliance Under the
Paris Agreement,” 4.
43
Ibid.
44
Bäckstrand et al., “Non-state actors in global climate governance: from Copenhagen to Paris and beyond,” 562.
45
Hale, “‘All Hands on Deck’: The Paris Agreement and Nonstate Climate Action,” 14.
46
“Paris Agreement,” 1, 5.
47
Ibid, 10.
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these actors, thereby challenging the existing global order, or distribution of power and authority
among the political actors on the global stage.
As evidenced above, the Paris Agreement explicitly incentivizes substate and nonstate
actors to make independent contributions and assume more of a leadership role in global climate
change mitigation, highlighting the growing importance of these actors in international climate
governance. As a result of this newfound influence, climate commitments have already been
made by “[o]ver 7,000 cities from more than 99 countries with a combined population of 794
million (11 percent of the global population) and around 32 percent of global GDP,” as well as
“[c]lose to 5,000 companies from over 88 countries representing over $38 trillion USD in
revenue.”48 Additionally, many of these efforts account for significant emission reductions. In
fact, the mitigation potential of only a handful of such initiatives is “in the range of 2.5-4 billion
tons of CO2 by 2020, more than India emits in a year, and similar in magnitude to the 4-6 billion
tons that UN projects the national pledges adopted in Paris will cut by 2030, a decade later.”49
In the absence of national leadership on climate change, the impact of such contributions
is even more profound because of the structure of the Agreement in centering substate and
nonstate action. For example, in July of 2017, after President Donald Trump decided to withdraw
the United States from the Agreement, “California lawmakers approved an extension of the
state’s cap-and-trade program. In August, a coalition of nine Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic
states—the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative—agreed to cut an additional 30 percent of
climate-warming pollution from the region’s power plants between 2020 and 2030.”50
Additionally, the governors of California, New York, and Washington recently created the U.S.
Climate Alliance, which now includes 14 states and Puerto Rico. In their 2017 annual report, the
Alliance reported that they are on track to achieve a 24-29% reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions below 2005 levels by 2025 based on state and local initiatives.51
Beyond the actions taken by substate governments in the United States, the Paris
Agreement has also influenced significant action by NGOs, businesses, and other organizations.
Signify, major lighting company, is working to become carbon neutral in all of its operations by
2020 “[a]s part of its carbon neutral commitment announced in 2015 at UN Climate Change
Conference COP21.”52 The company has already taken substantial steps to achieve this goal. For
48
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example, “Signify is purchasing 250,000 MWh of electricity per year over the next 15 years
from the Hidalgo Wind Farm in McCook, Texas, to power all of its North American operations
with 100% renewable electricity. This effort reduces carbon footprint by 125,000 metric tons
yearly - the equivalent of CO2 produced by over 26,000 cars in one year.”53 Since the
establishment of this carbon neutrality goal is a direct result of the Agreement, Signify’s efforts
explicitly demonstrate how the Paris Agreement has empowered substate and nonstate actors to
take meaningful independent action to address climate change, thereby increasing their influence
as a key player in global mitigation efforts.
Since the creation of this Agreement, the Monterey Bay Aquarium has also taken action
to combat the global climate crisis. The Aquarium has been working to increase energy
efficiency, and was certified as a carbon-neutral organization in 2017.54 More recently, “[o]n
March 1, 2018, the Aquarium’s electricity became ‘carbon free’ when it enrolled in Monterey
Bay Community Power (MBCP), a new community choice aggregator serving Monterey, Santa
Cruz and San Benito counties.”55 We Are Still In, a multi-organization NGO created in June
2017 in response to the U.S.’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and of which both Signify
and the Monterey Bay Aquarium are constituents, explicitly states that the Aquarium has been
taking “additional actions to meet or exceed the ambitious emissions targets set by the Paris
Agreement as well as the renewable energy and electric vehicle targets set by the State of
California.”56 Since the aforementioned initiatives were implemented after the development of
the Agreement in 2015, these efforts further illustrate how the Paris Agreement has enabled
significant substate and nonstate action, expanding their role in international climate action.
These meaningful contributions, promoted by the Paris Agreement and the politics of its
enforcement, exemplify increasing substate and nonstate power because, “[a]s cities,
corporations and NGOs have begun to develop their own rules and standards that others chose to
follow, they are no longer merely complying with the directives of nation-states or
intergovernmental treaties. They have become governors in their own right and established
‘private spheres of authority’ dislodged from the sovereign state.”57 By encouraging substate and
nonstate actors to adopt independent mitigation measures, and by explicitly providing them with
a greater role in the international climate regime, the Paris Agreement and the politics of its
enforcement inherently increase these actors’ ability to effect change on an international scale;
this in turn increases their ability to influence other actors, thereby augmenting their power.
In promoting meaningful involvement in implementing NDCs and ensuring public access
to information regarding these commitments, the Paris Agreement also provides substate and
53
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nonstate actors with a larger role in monitoring and enforcing state-developed mitigation efforts.
The enforcement of the Paris Agreement illustrates climate law and policy scholar Harro van
Asselt’s argument that substate and nonstate actors are crucial to the monitoring process because
such actors are “not subject to the same political constraints as the intergovernmental process,
and with the expertise and knowledge of the conditions prevailing in individual states, can thus
supplement the formal process by making visible and accessible how much progress is made.”58
The Paris Agreement also empowers these actors to investigate whether action being taken by a
national government is fair and ambitious. Such assessments can benefit the state that is under
review by providing information regarding how to fill existing gaps and make greater progress in
achieving a state’s NDC. Additionally, this information can be used by civil society, state and
local government officials, and other national and subnational actors to effect change on a
smaller scale. In enabling substate and nonstate actors to facilitate transparency by assessing and
publicizing progress, fairness, and ambition, the Paris Agreement entrusts these actors with a
crucial role in enforcing NDCs and promoting compliance through the mechanisms of social
pressure previously detailed.59 The enforcement of this Agreement actively encourages substate
and nonstate climate action, including monitoring state efforts, in the hope that such action will
pressure state actors to put forward ambitious commitments and “ratchet up” these commitments
over time.60 By increasing the role of substate and nonstate actors in monitoring and enforcing
NDCs, the Paris Agreement therefore provides these actors with a greater ability to influence
state behavior, consequently shaping international politics and augmenting the power of these
actors.
Overall, the text of the Paris Agreement indicates that authority is no longer vested solely
in state actors and national governments. As Karin Bäckstrand, Jonathan Kuyper, Björn-Ola
Linnér, and Eva Lövbrand argue in their investigation of non-state actors in global climate
governance, “[t]he Paris Agreement accepts that NDCs submitted by states are the backbone of
mitigation, adaptation, and finance, but also acknowledges that non-state actors are indispensable
in these pursuits as governors, implementers, experts and watchdogs.”61 In fact, a program,
known as the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA), that was created by the governments of France
and Peru, the UNFCCC, and the UN Secretary-General in an attempt to promote substate and
nonstate climate action, was declared “a fourth pillar of COP 21 alongside, and equal to, the
national pledges, the financing package, and the negotiated agreement.”62 This statement further
supports that “the Paris Agreement institutionalizes an intricate interplay between state and nonstate, multilateral and transnational climate action,” and that “[…] public and private authority is
58
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deeply intertwined in the new landscape of international climate cooperation” arising from the
adoption of this Agreement.63 Due to the explicitly inclusive and empowering language of the
Agreement and the subsequent action that is already being taken by substate and nonstate actors
globally, such actors have become central to the international climate regime since COP 21.64 As
scholar Thomas Hale argues, the explicit inclusion and significant role of substate and nonstate
actors at COP 21 and in the text of the Paris Agreement highlight that “the post-Paris climate
regime sees sub/nonstate actors not as an alternative to the UNFCCC process, or as merely a
helpful addition, but as a core element of its logic of spurring rising action on climate over
time.”65 The politics of the Paris Agreement are therefore evidence of an emerging “hybrid
multilateralism” characterized by increased cooperation, interplay, and shared power between
state, substate, and nonstate actors.66 In increasing the ability of substate and nonstate actors to
exercise power and exert influence over other actors, including states, the design and
enforcement of the Paris Agreement challenge the existing global order in which states are the
primary wielders of power, and provide evidence of a new emerging global order in which states
share power with and are balanced by substate and nonstate actors.
V. Conclusion
Ultimately, while some aspects of the Agreement’s design and ratification reaffirm the
existing global order by facilitating cooperation through international institutions via
mechanisms of state-exercised soft power, the overall politics of the Paris Agreement provide
strong evidence of a new emerging global order. The enforcement of this Agreement reflects this
transition by shifting power from state to substate and nonstate actors. While the politics of the
Agreement are indicative of a new emerging global order, this new order may still incorporate
some elements of the existing one. For example, the Paris Agreement may foster a more
integrated world with greater collaboration and cooperation between states, as well as between
state and nonstate actors. As illustrated in this paper, the Paris Agreement has already
substantially increased the influence of substate and nonstate actors on the international climate
regime. Beyond this regime, it is highly likely that these actors will soon play a more integral
role in international negotiations and foreign affairs more generally. While it remains uncertain
which aspects of the long-standing global order will persist in the newly emerging one, the
politics of the Paris Agreement clearly demonstrate a meaningful redistribution of power among
the political actors on the international stage, and may therefore significantly shape the future of
international relations.
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Evaluating Sebastian Rosato's Balance of Power Theory: A Case Study in The Collapse
of Europe's Great Experiment

Tyler Soutendijk
Swarthmore College

Less than two years after World War II, Europe was in shambles. The most monumental
war in world history had forced countries to consolidate all available resources, form precarious
alliances with foreigners, and witness bloodshed in their own backyards. In spite of recent
turmoil, a new military adversary emerged on the world stage that left European powers in
dismay - the Soviet Union. In a memo written in 1946 from the U.S. Joint Intelligence
Committee to Major General Alfred Gruenther: "The USSR [is] the leading military power on
the Eurasian landmass.... None of these countries [are] capable singly of waging a successful
defensive war against the USSR."67 The formidable USSR had both the strongest economy in
Europe, and a military advantage over Britain and France of 6.4:1 and 8.8:1 respectively.68 No
individual nation could impede the Soviet's westward expansion, so neighboring European
countries sought collaboration to counter the USSR threat. Winston Churchill, a luminary of the
previous decade, called for a "United Europe", declaring that "if the people of Europe resolve to
come together and work together for mutual advantage, they still have it in their power to sweep
away the horrors and miseries which surround them."69 As a result, the European Coal and Steel
Community (later tailored into the European Union70) was then formed to balance its collective
capability against the budding titan.
The inception of the European Union follows the framework of Sebastian Rosato’s
Balance of Power Theory. While many balance of power theories exist, this essay will focus on
the variant that Rosato has applied to the E.U. Sebastian Rosato, an Associate Professor of
Political Science at Notre Dame, argues that "Europe's shift from sovereign state system to
67
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supranational community" was for the sole purpose of centralizing power against Soviet
dominance in the region.71 And without a threat of power comparable to the magnitude of the
Soviet Union during the Cold War, member countries within the European Union wouldn't have
integrated into a supranational force. In the post-Cold War Era, Rosato is doubtful of the E.U.'s
future: "Simply put, the European Community’s best days are long gone and there is worse to
come."72 Therefore in years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Rosato predicts that the
E.U. is destined for deliberate fragmentation. In practice, temporary economic prosperity from
E.U. commerce has delayed its collapse, but recent stagnation in growth indicates a vindication
of Rosato's presumption. Balance of Power Theory cannot operate in isolation, but in
conjunction with stalled macroeconomic growth, E.U. disintegration is inevitable. This discourse
will affirm Rosato's central claim by synthesizing the principles of Balance of Power Theory as
they are evidenced in historical origins of the E.U., projecting the observable implications we
would expect from integrations of the E.U. following the Cold War Era, and comparing Rosato's
expectations to recent cases in post-war E.U. history. These three explicit components will act as
guiding logic to test the validity of Rosato's assessment and may be extrapolated to provide
insights into the future of the E.U.
Balance of Power Theory rests upon the widely acknowledged framework of the
anarchical system. Under the anarchical system, there is no overarching international authority
capable of setting governing laws or rules that dictate state behavior.73 States cannot know the
intentions of other players within the system and therefore are subject to fear of malevolent
action. Power, as defined by Rosato, refers to "material resources and organizational
effectiveness, which together determine a state's ability to deter or defend against potential
rivals".74 Professor Jack Levy classifies a "great power" as having the "relative self-sufficiency
with respect to military security".75 Member states in the aftermath of WWII lacked power
relative to the indominable USSR and were thus relegated as "minor powers". With the European
continent in ruins, structural instability left their armies and economies vulnerable to external
threats. Individual nations once glorified for the success of previous empires were now worried
that their neighbor would decide to repeat Germany's transgressions.
European leaders knew that westward expansion of the Soviet Union was imminent.
Amidst the veil of war with the Third Reich, the USSR was able to usurp almost all of Eastern
71
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Europe (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and the eastern part of Germany). The Soviets then were
able to continue their expansionist policies following World War II, labeled by Churchill in his
1946 highly publicized speech as the spread of the "iron curtain". Having conquered the East,
Western Europe was the next most likely candidate. The looming threat prompted swift action on
behalf of member states.
Every country in Western Europe shared a common adversary and subsequently a
common threat to national security. Individually, none of these nation-states were capable of
deterring the Soviet threat, but collectively as James Morrow proclaims, "nations form alliances
to increase their security by amassing their capabilities against a common enemy."76
Concentrating the power of sovereign states into a centralized authority would give Europeans
the economic controls needed to accomplish the objective of providing collective security to its
member states. Aligning with the Balance of Power Theory, European nation-states living in the
anarchical system with a superior adversary of the Soviet Union, had no other option under the
pressure of national interests and common intentions than to counterbalance in the manifestation
of a political union. Tony Judt in Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 echoes a similar
viewpoint: "For nations reared within living memory on grandeur and glory, ‘Europe’ would
always be an uncomfortable transition: a compromise, not a choice."77 Therefore because of
systemic fear in the anarchical system, an imminent threat of Soviet westward expansion, and a
shared adversary between Western European countries, the European Union was established.
Formation of the European Union involved deliberation over political, militaristic, and
economic integration. All three of these components required alignment of supranational and
national interests. State actors will support a supranational cause as long as it aligns with their
national interest. A state’s paramount national interest is security that comes in the form of
power in both relative and absolute terms. During Cold War, national interests lined up with
supranational interests because of the common threat to security. After the war, although
collective security was no longer a necessity, temporary economic prosperity (derived from
interstate commerce) kept the E.U. intact. However due to recent macroeconomic decline,
national protectionist interests have gained popularity. In the absence of the Soviet Union, we
would expect to witness gradual disintegration of the European Union, slowed by transient
economic growth. The next section will elaborate on observable implications that can be
expected from Balance of Power Theory following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The European Union, a cooperative instrument of international affairs, was held together
by a shared goal. There was a geostrategic reason to pursue integration and preserve their
76
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existing community. Rosato cites successful political integration in the Cold War Era because
there was a unique circumstance of the "scale and proximity of the Soviet threat."78 The E.U. in
the 1950's needed a centralized union because their collective power was the only means of
deterring the USSR. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the absence of that
geostrategic necessity led to divergent political agendas. Agendas diverged because an
investment of political capital involved surrendering sovereignty in specific areas. These areas of
governance were vital to success of the EU, but came at the expense of national strategic
interests. Hence, according to Balance of Power Theory, we should see a shift of political
disintegration toward a decentralized political union that ensures retained sovereignty of member
states.
The divergence of political agendas should come in the context of two components:
aversion to unification and economic insecurity. First, reluctance to unify in the EU's early years
is a sign of future disinclination. A notorious example of failure to garner collaboration was the
inability to ratify the European Defense Community (EDC) project. This was partially due to the
incumbent presence of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), an intergovernmental
military alliance composed of Western European countries and the United States. NATO’s main
purpose was to oppose the Soviet Union militarily in anticipation of a Soviet offensive. The EDC
project also proved too ambitious for countries like France who recently regained sovereignty
and national identity from the death of Stalin.79 Member states questioned the obligation of their
own militaries in the tragedy of preceding decades. The collective gain from a supranational
military alliance, in deference to both the presence of NATO and reluctance to dedicate soldiery,
wasn't enough to form a centralized military. Consequently, in the absence of a Soviet
opposition, we would expect continued aversion to unification.
Second, economic insecurity from a deficient Eurozone structure forecasts a potential
collapse under fiscal pressures. This insecurity can be attributed to the evolution of the European
Coal and Steel Community, a centralized regulatory body for industrial production in Western
Europe.80 Western Europe in World War II needed to devise an economic community in order to
consolidate resources and neutralize Soviet power. Tied to the European ideals of a connected
Europe, the Eurozone (an economic region of countries that have adopted the Euro) served to
encourage free trade and flow of capital. The Eurozone at its zenith had 4.4% GDP growth per
annum with an unemployment rate of 7% in 1988.81 In recent years however, the single market
economy continues to face challenges. Despite a foundation of admirable ideals, "the eurozone
78
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was not structured to accommodate Europe's economic diversity…the structure of the
eurozone…[was] not designed to promote growth, employment and stability."82 The Euro locked
each member state to a fixed exchange rate, delivering one-size-fits-all monetary policy without
considering variance in fiscal discipline. As a result, because the structure of the Eurozone isn't
apt for withstanding fiscal calamity, we would expect the European Union to collapse under
fiscal pressures.
Therefore, it's concluded that divergent political agendas in the absence of a common
threat, and in a context of aversion to unification and economic insecurity, will propel the
disintegration of the E.U. in post-war era. Three cases of evidence for disintegration that will be
discussed in the next section are the Greek government-debt crisis, Brexit, and populist uprisings
in Eastern Europe.
The Greek government-debt crisis made international news when Greece declared in
2009 that its budget deficit would be 12.9% of GDP. While global economies were all
recovering from the 2008 Financial Crisis, the news caused waves throughout the Eurozone.83
Although there is a "one-size-fits-all" monetary policy in the E.U., fiscal policy is reserved to the
respective countries' discretion. As Rosato claims, "fiscal policy [is a] ...source of friction, pitting
members that want to run greater deficits against proponents of tighter fiscal discipline."84 Stalled
macroeconomic growth of the union is driven by the constraint of weak performance from poorer
states on the economic prosperity of wealthier counterparts. Since national interests in post-war
Europe are no longer aligned with supranational cooperation, states would start to question their
obligation to this parasitic union.
One prominent player that decided to give into Euroscepticism was the United Kingdom
in 2016. In a country-wide referendum that earned international news coverage, 52% of the U.K.
population voted for withdrawal from the E.U. The United Kingdom was one of the three
founding actors of the E.U. community, and their attrition signals to the rest of the E.U. that no
member is obligated to remain. Experts have projected that the removal of Britain could lead
other nations to follow suit. Sweden and Denmark, for example, have both rejected handing over
integral powers to the coalition, and right-wing leaders push for a similar referendum.85
Collective movement toward gradual exodus isn’t a positive sign for the future of the European
Union.
Many populist movements within Eastern European countries have borne out of
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nationalist interests from migrant influx. These protectionist ideologies have shaped recent
elections in Eastern Europe, and significantly hindered cooperative investment in E.U. policy. A
massive refugee influx into certain regions of the E.U. have caused indigenous workers to feel
their values of nationalism threatened and their jobs at risk. For example, Countries along the
Balkan migration route like Germany and Hungary have pushed back against E.U. immigration
policy and forced delegated migrants to resettle in Turkey.86 The European Union doesn’t have
the authority to enforce settlement of migrants in selected countries. As a result, the
supranational E.U. had to reluctantly accept a E.U.-Turkey migration accord to allow these
member countries to send back refugees. This drawback shows the weakening legitimacy of the
E.U., fueled by ethnocentric attitudes and protectionist ideology.
The Greek government debt-crisis, Brexit, and populist movements in Eastern Europe are
all evidence of disintegration of the European Union. Observable implications from Rosato's
Balance of Power Theory of divergent political agendas in the context of aversion to unification
and economic insecurity have all contributed toward these three cases in E.U. history. However,
temporary economic prosperity following the downfall of the Soviet Union is the only factor that
cannot be explained by Balance of Power Theory. That is why the gradual emergence of stalled
macroeconomic growth from temporary economic prosperity is the cornerstone to slowly
dismantling the E.U. Balance of Power Theory is imperfect and requires this second variable in
order to operate properly. Alongside the necessity of stalled macroeconomic growth, there are
two other stipulations to complete the argument.
Events in recent E.U. politics have affirmed Rosato's presumption, but an important
consideration is that this theory is only derived from the European Union and cannot be
extrapolated to ulterior cases. Hence, the scholar doesn't allow for any replication of this unique
event. Professor Craig Parsons concludes, "the conditions that are supposed to have created it
cannot have been present in other places or at other times."87 The circumstance must consist of: a
series of minor powers within a similar geographical location, all unable to deter the adversary
on their own merit, in a "perfect storm" of desperation, against an external threat of incredible
magnitude. These criterion leave limited room to contest the theory in civil debate.
Sebastian Rosato’s Balance of Power Theory is also one of many International Relations
models that scholars have applied to explain the origination of the E.U. An alternate model that
Rosato mentions to explain interstate cooperation of the E.U. is the community model88 known
as ideational entrepreneurship. In contrast to Rosato's balance of power argument, the ideational
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entrepreneurship approach holds that integration cannot solely be understood as an objective
response to geopolitical or economic imperatives. European integration was driven because
leaders with "pro-community" ideas came into power in France and Germany.89 Nonetheless,
Rosato sees a flaw in this causal logic by citing that there is scant evidence that prominent
political figures subscribed to this reasoning.
The European Union is considered by many to be the "most extraordinary experiment in
the history of political institutions."90 In the period of post-WWII Europe, it was revered as the
glue that would bring peace and prosperity to the continent. The E.U. was a beacon of hope for
European nations that had lost their fortuitous power in previous decades. Sebastian Rosato's
Balance of Power Theory successfully explains the formation of this union, and in conjunction
with stalled macroeconomic growth following a period of economic prosperity, it's inevitable
demise. Anticipating the aforementioned disintegration, scholars believe there are five
fundamental challenges that face the E.U.: overexpansion, the collapse of the Soviet Empire (inline with Rosato's theory), the euro crisis, a deteriorating regional environment, and the
persistence of nationalism.91 All five of these tribulations will not be easy to overcome given the
current political climate. According to Rosato, the European Union must either face an adversary
comparable to the Soviet Union or be destined to a slow demise. In the dynamic international
system, International Relations theorists can never be confident in definitive predictions. We can
conclude by Rosato’s logic in conjunction with stalled macroeconomic growth, and borne out in
evidence by recent E.U. politics, that the European Union will inevitably dismantle. Although
the European goal of an "even closer union" is unlikely, this is not to say that the European states
will stop cooperating with each other.92 The E.U. has been successful in linking neighboring
nations in the socio-cultural emergence of a common European identity. Even as the E.U.'s
power wanes, it will always be remembered as a remarkable political achievement that has
fostered the core of European exceptionalism.
In many ways the E.U. has set the standard for a model liberal institution. The idea of a
failing E.U. has serious implications for our perspective of global order. If global order is
composed of a multiplicity of independent state actors, and liberal institutions made up of these
actors aren’t surviving over time, then the future of the global order may be an attrition of
supranational institutions. Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, World
Bank, and World Health Organization all rest upon the same principle of cooperative action to
solve dilemmas beyond the capacity of an individual nation. Does this imply that there’s an
89
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overarching decline in interstate cooperation? The rise of protectionist movements challenging
incumbent governments may indicate warning signs of this phenomena. Without interstate
cooperation as the cornerstone of the international system, global order will cease to operate. A
network of distrust between actors in the system will impede any collective action. Collective
action amongst nations functions to regulate economies, prevent wars, and aid humanitarian
crises. The self-serving mentality of fixating on national interests will dismantle the fabric of
global community. Looking forward, we must continue to bridge cultural boundaries through the
diaspora of globalization. The global order is comprised of generations capable of igniting
political change. One liberal institution doesn’t have to determine the future course of global
order. The European Union may collapse, but there’s still hope in the establishment.
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